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Abstract 
The study investigates how the composition and character of aid of Swedish aid has changed over 
time, and what effects these changes have had for the potential to realize key aspects of the Paris 
agenda such as ownership, alignment, harmonisation, and accountability and the ability to deliver aid 
efficiently. We analyse the changes in Swedish aid flows since 1990 and compare with changes in the 
global pattern in terms of purpose, country allocation, channels, and modalities. We discuss how 
these changes are likely to have affected the efficiency of Sweden as a donor. We conclude with a 
discussion about the future direction of Swedish aid. 
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1. Introduction 
The structure of foreign aid has changed over the last decades, and it is now important to consider 
how this affects its ability to contribute effectively to global development. The aim of this study is to 
investigate how the composition and character of aid delivered by Sweden has changed over time, 
and what effects these changes have had for the potential to realize key aspects of the Paris agenda 
such as ownership, alignment, harmonisation, and accountability and the ability to deliver aid 
efficiently. 
We start with a brief historical review of the global trends in aid policy and in particular how these 
have played out in Sweden. We then look at the changes in Swedish aid flows since 1990 and 
compare these with changes in the global pattern. We consider how the purposes, country 
allocation, channels, and modalities of aid have changed. Then we discuss whether the changes are 
in line with the norms of good donor behaviour according to the Paris Agenda and how these 
changes are likely to have affected the efficiency of Sweden as a donor. We conclude with a few 
thoughts about the future directions of Swedish aid. 
 
2. The Evolution of Swedish Aid Policy 
 
2.1 Early developments 
 
Swedish official foreign aid as we know it today started in the 1960s (Government of Sweden, 1962). 
The stated purposes were to support development in poor countries and to provide humanitarian 
support during crises. It has been suggested that the overarching goal of Swedish aid has always 
been to contribute to a fairer global development, and that it has never been governed by strategic 
or security considerations (Stokke, 1978). The main rationale for aid, at the time, was that poor 
countries were too poor to be able to save enough to finance required investments and too 
underdeveloped to be attractive destinations for private investment, and Swedish aid policy reflected 
this. The focus of Swedish aid was initially on infrastructure and social development in poor 
countries.  
During the 1970s the development debate emphasized that economic growth was not enough, since 
large groups did not benefit from it (Chenery et al., 1974). Donors, including Sweden, sought to 
refocus aid policies towards redistribution, employment, and the basic needs of people (ILO, 1976). 
Sweden also had an ambition to provide aid “on the conditions of the recipient”. Sweden was early 
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on concerned with the issue of ownership. In the light of these debates four new sub-goals for 
Swedish aid were formulated in 1977, namely resource growth, economic and social development, 
economic and political independence, and a democratic development of society (Government of 
Sweden, 1977). These were then complemented in 1988 and 1996 with targets of sustainable 
development and gender and income equality (Government of Sweden, 1988 and 1996).  
In the late 1970s, after two oil crises and global stagflation, many poor countries found themselves in 
a situation with severe macroeconomic imbalances and low growth, which led to a shift in the 
emphasis of aid policy towards macro issues and the preconditions for growth. Policy reforms were a 
much larger focus of aid negotiations than previously. Structural adjustment packages were 
implemented in many countries, and gradually also Swedish aid supported adjustment programmes 
or was conditioned on their implementation. 
After the Cold War the aid became less strategically important for the major donors, and from 1992 
global aid volumes stagnated or even declined. In the case of Sweden, though, the cutbacks of aid in 
the 1990s were due to a budgetary crisis. Like many other donors during this period Sweden now 
focused more on the democracy target, although it had been on the agenda throughout. 
In the 1990s Sweden emphasized the need for a Partnership for Development. The ambition was that 
Sweden would move away from an interventionistic aid policy and place the main responsibility for 
aid implementation with the recipient (again). The new partnership relationship was to be based on 
dialogue, and it should be consistent with the national development strategies of the recipient 
countries. Sweden’s aid relations with the most important partner countries were based on country 
strategies developed by Sida in collaboration with the Foreign Office, but there was also increased 
emphasis on coordination with other donors. To make interventions sustainable there was an 
ambition to have shared financing of interventions with the recipient government. Interventions 
should have clear targets and a time plan and a decided end point for the Swedish interventions. Aid 
should be catalytic and help support the recipients’ own development efforts. During the cutbacks in 
the 1990s there was de facto a change in the opposite direction, though, to more projects and less 
general forms of aid. It was easier to cut general transfers such as budget support than ongoing 
projects when the budget was reduced.  
Although structural adjustment reforms were implemented in the 1980s and 1990s and many macro-
economic imbalances were reduced, economic stagnation and poor provision of public goods 
continued in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore there was dissatisfaction with the efficiency of aid and in 
particular with regard to its effect on poverty. This led to a lively international debate on aid 
efficiency and the organization of aid.  
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 2.2 The MDG era 
One result of this discussion was the international agreement on the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) in 2002, which specified a set of global goals to be achieved by 2015. The central goal was to 
half the proportion of people in developing countries living in absolute poverty (consuming less than 
one dollar per day) relative to the situation in 1990, while the other goals were formulated as targets 
for a range of social indicators (education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health care, 
HIV/AIDS and other diseases), environmental sustainability, and global participation in development. 
The MDGs had a considerable impact on Swedish aid policy, although poverty reduction was already 
high on the agenda. 
Another novelty was the focus on the use of aid for the production of global public goods, i.e. goods 
that are important for large parts of the world. One may crudely distinguish between three different 
types of global public goods. The first one is related to international and global common assets. This 
concerns primarily different environmental aspects. The second category is related to international 
and global political choices. This includes for example questions about the stability of the 
international financial system, the prevention of conflicts, the fight against diseases, the fight against 
crime and corruption. The third category is related to international or global knowledge, such as 
different forms of research, the creation of vaccines, research on HIV/AIDS, research on drought 
resistant crops, statistics etc.  
At the beginning of the new millennium a special committee (Globkom) was given the task to 
undertake a broad analysis of Swedish policy for global development (SOU 2001:96), particularly 
about how Swedish policy within different fields affects development in poor countries. The starting 
points for the report were a South perspective and a rights perspective. According to the latter the 
global development goals were human rights and the support of development in a general sense, i.e. 
to guarantee freedom, wellbeing, and human dignity. The committee defined rights as everyone’s 
right to a life without poverty (p. 68). 
The report noted that although market processes were very important for development, they 
needed to be complemented by policy and supporting international rules. It also emphasized the 
importance of coherence between different policy areas. The report suggested that the Swedish 
government should always take the effect of all its policies (not only aid policies) on poverty in the 
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developing countries into account. The report also suggested that government institutions should 
undertake analyses of global distributional consequences of its policies.1  
In 2003 the Parliament decided on a Policy for Global Development (Politik för global utveckling – 
PGU) indicating that global concerns should always be taken into account when deciding on policies 
in Sweden (Government of Sweden, 2003). The target of the government was to support fair and 
sustainable global development.  The radical position was that the target would apply to all policy 
areas, but in particular to trade, agriculture, environment, security, migration and economic policies. 
The aim was to have coherent policies that would contribute to the achievement of the MDGs. The 
overarching goal formulated for development cooperation was to “create conditions that will enable 
poor people to improve the quality of their lives” (Government of Sweden, 2003).2 
The major restatement of what good aid practices are was made in a series of donor conferences, 
which led to the Rome Declaration on Harmonization in 2003, the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness in 2005, the Accra Agenda for Action in 2009, and the Busan High Level Forum 4 in 
2011. The Paris Declaration provided a comprehensive agenda for effective aid processes covering 
five areas, namely ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual 
accountability. The meeting in Accra reaffirmed the commitments of the Paris Declaration, but also 
discussed the role of new donors and civil society organisations. It also emphasized that the nature of 
conditionality should be changed to support ownership. In Busan new donors and developing 
countries have been more extensively involved than previously, but although the Busan Declaration 
opened up for the newer participants, the aid agenda did not change dramatically.3  
It listed four principles that should guide development cooperation: 1) Ownership of development 
priorities by developing countries. The idea that developing countries should define their own 
development strategies thus remained a central feature of the aid agenda. 2) Focus on results. Like in 
the Paris declaration, the importance of learning from experience and of aligning aid inflows with 
recipient priorities and policies was emphasized. 3) Inclusive development partnerships. In the 
discussion about aid modalities in the declaration the need to reduce fragmentation was underlined. 
                                                          
1
 In parallel to the Swedish discussion there was at the European level an extensive discussion about Policy 
Coherence in Development (PCD). The EU identified five global challenge areas relating to PCD, namely trade 
and finance, climate change, global food security, migration, and security. See e.g. ECPDM (2007). 
2
 The problems of implementing the policy for global development are discussed by Fellesson and Roman 
(2016). Their analysis is not able to identify much in terms of concrete results. Among the close to 1000 
reported activities they are able to find in government documents, more than two thirds report activities 
without information about either actors, funding, or results. See also the analysis by The Swedish Agency for 
Public Management (Statskontoret, 2014).  
3
 Donors met to discuss the implementation of the Busan-agenda at a follow-up meeting in Mexico in 2014, the 
First High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (Global Partnership, 
2014).  
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The Busan Declaration put a lot of emphasis on how to incorporate new actors (South-South 
cooperation) and new aid modalities into the processes. 4) Transparency and accountability. There 
was an even stronger focus in the Busan declaration than in the earlier ones on the issues of 
transparency and accountability. Democratic accountability is important for governments if they are 
to be legitimate to their citizens, but it is also very important for the donor-recipient relation. Still, 
since it was primarily the meeting in Paris that set the agenda, and its general directions still prevail, 
we refer to the set of agreed policy directions as the Paris agenda. We have noted that element of 
the Paris agenda were introduced into the Swedish aid policy already before the agenda was in place, 
but Sweden has not gone as far in practice as implied in policy documents.4  
The centre-right government that took over in 2006 claimed to remain focused on poverty reduction. 
In 2007 it identified three thematic priorities that were to be the focus of Swedish aid, namely 
democracy and human rights, environment and climate change, and gender equality and the role of 
women in development (OECD/DAC, 2013). At the same time, a large number of strategy documents 
were produced, which made the overall picture of Swedish development policy complex and 
overburdened. The DAC review argued that the proliferation of strategies meant that there was in 
practice a lack of prioritisation (OECD, 2014, p. 57).There was also a gradual shift in policy towards 
stricter control of disbursements and attempts to have clearly defined targets for Swedish aid against 
which it could be evaluated. There was an increased use of Results-Based Management of projects 
(see e.g. Foller et al., 2013). This probably was one of the reasons that Sweden did not meet the 
target for the share of programme based approaches set up in the Paris Declaration (OECD/DAC, 
2014, p. 20). There was an ambition to reduce the number of partner countries, but after an initial 
drop in 2007-2009, the number increased again (Hagen, 2015). There was also an attempt to increase 
transparency and information to the general public about aid activities. The overall aim of Swedish 
foreign aid was re-formulated by the government to combat poverty and oppression (Government of 
Sweden, 2014).  
In 2014 Sweden shifted to a Social-Democratic/Green government, and the Foreign Office started a 
process to identify and analyse the conditions, challenges and risks for sustainable development in 
the short and in the long run. The aid agenda is now discussed within the framework of the new and 
equally comprehensive global Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015) and Sweden’s Policy for 
Global Development (PGU). It remains to be seen to what extent Sweden’s aid strategies will be 
changed. 
 
                                                          
4
 See e.g. Odén (2015) for a discussion of the role of the Paris agenda for aid relations with Tanzania. 
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3. Changes in the Sectoral Allocation of  Swedish Bilateral Aid 
There are many dimensions of Swedish policy that are relevant for global development: Traditional 
aid to projects, programmes, or budgets, global public goods, loans, private/public intermediate 
forms, and activity within international organizations. The discussion here concerns resource 
transfers which are characterized as aid by DAC. 
It would seem most natural to look at data for aid disbursements, but since there is much more 
missing data for disbursements than for commitments for the first periods we consider (1990-2004) 
we choose to look at the distribution of commitments.5 For the latter periods (2005-2013) when 
there is less missing data we can compare the two measurements, and we then see that they (at 
least for five-year averages) track each other well. We may also note that was mainly use CRS data, 
which covers a smaller share of aid for 1990-1999. It is primarily a part of loans that are missing. Had 
we used disbursements data instead the missing share would have been larger.  
Sweden gives aid through two main channels, bilateral aid via Sida and multilateral aid via the 
Foreign Office. In this section we focus on Swedish bilateral aid, since this best reflects the desired 
orientation of Swedish aid. Multilateral aid, i.e. resources transferred to the UN, multilateral 
development banks, the EU etc. is also substantial, but does not show the Swedish aid orientation in 
an equally direct manner. Still, we will discuss Swedish multilateral aid briefly in the following 
section. As can be seen in Appendix Table A1, around 70% of Swedish aid is considered bilateral and 
30% multilateral. This pattern has been rather stable since the 1990s with some increase in the share 
of multilateral aid in recent years. We may also note that there has been some increase in multi-bi 
aid, that is ODA which is bilateral in character (e.g. determined within the Swedish land strategy for a 
country) but which is channeled and delivered through a multilateral organization. This is only 
reported separately from 2005 when it was 14% of total Swedish aid. Its share had increased to 20 % 
by 2012. So overall, as of 2016, about half of Swedish aid is ultimately implemented through 
multilateral channels.  
Table 1 gives a broad picture of how the sectoral orientation of Swedish bilateral aid has changed 
since 1990.6 We see that there has been a moderate re-orientation towards social sectors over time 
and that the share of spending on social infrastructure has been close to 40 % in recent years. There 
                                                          
5
 Commitment per definition are gross, which means that loans are valued as highly as grants in spite of the 
fact that they will have to be repaid. This means that the real resource transfer is exaggerated. 
6
 At present, aid through Sida is handled via 15 budget posts and with the help of about 40 strategies. Sida has 
four cross-cutting thematic strategies for global interventions, namely socially sustainable development, 
environmental and climate sustainable development, economically sustainable development, and global 
security interventions. 
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has been a strong decline in the share of aid going to economic infrastructure and productive sectors, 
which declined from about 27 % to about 12%. The multisector/cross-cutting category also declined 
significantly. This category includes environmental interventions, which did not decline, while the 
multisector aid component declined a lot. The relatively high initial level of other commodity aid 
reflects the extensive use of import support aid in the early 1990s, but that has essentially been 
phased out. It looks like General Budget Support has declined a lot in the most recent period, but this 
decline is actually only in commitments, not in disbursements. So in practice it does not show any 
clear trend. Actions relating to debt are relatively small throughout, but it was significant in some 
years. For example, in 2006 debt forgiveness was over 10% of Swedish aid. In recent years it has not 
mattered much, since Sweden has shifted more or less fully toward grants rather than loans.7 
Humanitarian aid does not show any trend, but fluctuates according to the crises that occur. The 
most dramatic change concerns the share of Swedish bilateral aid going to refugees in the donor 
country. Since parts of the costs for refugees in Sweden started to be covered by the aid budget, the 
share of refugee costs has become very significant; by 2013 it was as high as 18 % and with the 
recent refugee crisis it has increased to 30% for 2016.8 This increase is noted with some concern in 
the DAC review of Swedish Aid 2013 (OECD/DAC, 2014). Since the share of Swedish ODA going to 
multilateral aid has, if anything, increased, the aid to refugees has mainly crowed out other bilateral 
aid.  Finally, the category of administrative costs was not reported separately in the first years (it was 
included in the category “other”), but since then it has remained stable at around 6 %. 
Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Swedish bilateral aid commitments by sector 1990-2013 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 
Social infrastructure & Sevices 35.66 38.91 33.51 39.25 40.13 
Economic infrastructure & Services 12.52 12.47 7.97 6.21 5.04 
Productive sectors 14.17 8.14 3.66 5.31 7.06 
Multisector/ Cross-cutting 21.07 14.85 11.09 7.48 7.63 
Other Commodity aid 1.7 0 0 0.21 0.04 
General Budget Support 3.05 3.18 6.24 6.76 0.98 
Actions Relating to Debt 0.15 0.45 2.75 3.18 1.4 
Humanitarian aid 9.12 15.61 12.47 11.53 11.86 
Refugees in donor country 0 0.01 5.2 9.04 16.28 
Other 2.55 6.38 17.11 11.03 9.57 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 
Note: Administrative costs only reported separately from 1999.  
Source: DAC, CRS data.   
                                                          
7
 In the period 2010-2013 the share of non-grants in Swedish aid commitments was 0.7%, in bilateral DAC aid 
14.9% and in multilateral aid 23.8%. 
8
 Within the Swedish aid frame one includes costs of the immigration authorities, counties and communes for 
asylum seekers from low- and middle income countries from the day they apply for asylum until the day they 
receive a decision. Around 96 % of asylum seekers are in this category (Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys, 
2014). 
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Next we compare the changes of Sweden’s aid orientation with that of other DAC donors. We 
compute the percentage allocation of total bilateral DAC aid (Appendix Table A2) and multilateral aid 
(including the EU) (Appendix Table A3). To facilitate comparisons between the Swedish allocation 
and that of other bilateral DAC donors and the multilaterals we simply divide the percentage figures 
in Table 1 with the corresponding figures for all bilaterals and multilaterals. Thus, looking at Tables 2 
and 3, all values above one indicate that Sweden has a stronger orientation towards the specific 
sector than the donor groups with which it is compared. 
Table 2: Swedish percentage allocation relative to total bilateral DAC donor allocation 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 
Social infrastructure & Sevices 1.94 1.40 0.99 1.02 1.03 
Economic infrastructure & Services 0.47 0.47 0.55 0.45 0.29 
Productive sectors 1.05 0.82 0.55 0.87 0.93 
Multisector/ Cross-cutting 2.58 1.74 1.47 1.08 0.72 
Other Commodity aid 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.03 
General Budget Support 0.29 0.61 1.50 2.24 0.54 
Actions Relating to Debt 0.01 0.05 0.19 0.23 0.42 
Humanitarian aid 3.82 2.53 1.63 1.45 1.34 
Refugees in donor country - 0.02 2.89 4.07 4.20 
Other 3.04 1.66 2.52 1.69 1.53 
Note: The entries in the tables are simply the percentage in a category for Swedish bilateral aid divided by the same 
percentage for bilateral DAC donors. 
Sources: Tables 1 and A2. 
We see from Table 2 that relative to other bilateral DAC donors Sweden in 1990 had a much stronger 
focus on social infrastructure, but that this difference shrunk during the 2000s when the emphasis of 
other donors shifted in this direction. However, if one looks at the allocation of the bilateral aid that 
is not used for refugees in the donor country, Sweden still has a significantly stronger focus on social 
infrastructure. Thus, in spite of the fact that Sweden’s share increased, the share increased even 
faster in other countries. This reflects the strong emphasis on social goals in the MDGs. Bilateral aid 
has generally become more poverty-oriented since the 1990s (Claessens, Cassimon, Van 
Campenhout, 2009). When it comes to economic infrastructure, though, the other bilateral donors 
had a much stronger focus than Sweden throughout. Sweden’s share remained at about half that of 
the others and even declined to 29% in the last period. Sweden had early on a rather strong 
emphasis on productive sectors, such as agriculture, but by 2013 Sweden’s focus on production was 
less than that of the other bilateral donors. Multisector assistance had a strong emphasis in Sweden 
relative to the others in the 1990s, reflecting large import-support. In line with the arguments for 
general forms of aid, Sweden gave more than other bilateral donors as general budget support 2000-
2009, but then this emphasis declined. Sweden was never very involved in debt reduction efforts, 
largely because it gave out only small amounts of aid in the form of loans. Sweden had initially a 
much stronger focus on humanitarian aid than the other bilateral donors, but the share at the end of 
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the period is now much closer to that of the other donors. Finally, we see that since 2000-2004 there 
has been strong increase in the share of aid money used in Sweden relative to that of other bilateral 
donors to cover the costs of refugees. Sweden stands out in that category, but Sweden has of course 
also received more asylum seekers per capita than any other DAC donor. 
Table 3: Swedish bilateral percentage allocation relative multilateral donor allocation 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 
Social infrastructure & Sevices 1.30 1.18 0.82 0.92 1.03 
Economic infrastructure & Services 0.68 0.61 0.40 0.34 0.20 
Productive sectors 0.58 0.56 0.33 0.54 0.65 
Multisector/ Cross-cutting 1.68 1.38 1.30 0.74 0.73 
Other Commodity aid &  
General program ass. 
1.14 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.10 
General Budget Support 0.25 0.46 0.66 0.83 0.22 
Actions Relating to Debt - 3.21 3.57 2.34 3.11 
Humanitarian aid 2.90 1.82 2.53 2.31 2.44 
Other 6.54 3.01 7.44 3.39 2.52 
Note: The entries in the tables are simply the percentage in a category for Swedish bilateral aid divided by the same 
percentage for multilateral DAC donors. The category “refugees in donor country” is excluded, since it is not relevant for 
the multilateral donors. 
Sources: Tables 1 and A3. 
Relative to the multilateral donors (Table 3) we see that Sweden’s focus on social infrastructure had 
a development that very much resembles that of the multilaterals (including the European 
Commission). But multilaterals have from the beginning a much stronger focus on economic 
infrastructure, and they have maintained this in the MDG-era as well. Also aid to productive sectors 
is more important for the multilaterals than for Sweden. They also have a stronger focus on general 
programme assistance, which is not so surprising given the large structural adjustment efforts 
undertaken. The multilaterals matter less in humanitarian aid. 
Thus, over time there has been convergence of the allocation patterns of different donors. Glennie 
and Sumner (2014) summarize the aid and development debate and conclude that there has been a 
measure of convergence of policies over the last decade.9 Still, Swedish aid policy is not driven by 
self-interest in the way that it is among major donors like France, the US, and Japan. Dreher, Molders 
and Nunnenkamp (2010) find that Sweden allocates less aid to recipient countries with better 
resource endowments and large export markets. They hypothesize that this is because these 
characteristics can signal less need for aid. So although Sweden resembles other donors more in 
terms of its sectoral allocation of aid, it still stands out as being more altruistic than the major 
                                                          
9
 New donors like China are interfering less in recipient country governance. Merit is a criterion that matters for 
western aid. New donors seem to care less about needs when allocating their aid resources across countries 
(Dreher, Nunnenkamp, Thiele, 2011). 
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donors. We may also note that Sweden has for most of the period stood by its goal of giving one per 
cent of gross national income in aid. 
4. Changes in the Sectoral Allocation  of  Swedish Aid through Multilaterals 
To check whether Swedish priorities as reflected in its allocation of aid to multinationals differ from 
those of the bilateral allocation we have computed the indirect sector allocation of Swedish money 
through the multilaterals by weighing together the multilateral allocations by the Swedish shares 
given to the respective organisation. Due to data limitations we can only perform this analysis for 
2011-2013. During this period about 30 % of Sweden’s aid was direct multilateral aid. Of Sweden’s 
multilateral aid in 2011-2013 approximately 40 % went to UN agencies, 20 % to IDA, 20 % to EU 
institutions, a bit less than 10 % to regional development banks, and a bit over 10 % to other 
agencies. 
First we look at the 50 % that goes to the UN and other agencies. We confine the analysis to the top 
ten multinationals in this category receiving money from Sweden.10 
Table 4a: Percentage Distribution of Sweden multilateral aid disbursements (to UN agencies and other agencies) by sector 
2011-2013 
 2011 2012 2013 
Social infrastructure 
& Services 
65.04 63.88 66.80 
Economic infrastructure & Services 0.61 0.59 0.65 
Productive sectors 0.38 0.46 0.33 
Multisector/ Cross-cutting 6.50 5.58 5.10 
Commodity aid &General program ass, 0.40 1.16 0.30 
Actions Relating to Debt    
Humanitarian aid 19.21 19.17 17.44 
Other 7.86 9.15 9.38 
Note: Weighted by Swedish allocation to 10 largest multilateral recipients   
Sources: RIR 2014:24 and DAC CRS 
 
                                                          
10
 The top 10 in 2014 were the Global Fund Against Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) – 500 million SEK, 
UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) – 640 million,, World Food Program (WFP) – 550 million, UN’s 
Children’s fund (Unicef) – 550 million, UN Population Fund (UNFPA) – 485 million,  UN’s fund for catastrophe 
relief (CERF)
 10
 – 410 million, The Global Vaccination Alliance (GAVI) – 350 million, the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) – 510 million, UN Fund for relief to Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) 282 million, UN’s 
programme against HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) – 230 million. 
Statistics of the multilateral aid allocation among those 10 multilateral organizations between the years 2011-
2013 come from a Swedish National Audit Office report (RIR, 2014) and the statistics of the actual sector 
allocation for the 10 multilateral organizations is found in the OECD CRS dataset. The sector allocation of 
Swedish multilateral aid presented in table 8a are the calculated by actual sector allocation for the 10 
multilateral organizations weighted by the proportion of Swedish multilateral aid allocated to the different 
organizations in the years 2011-2013. 
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Looking at Table 4a we note that the Swedish multilateral aid that goes to the UN and other agencies 
has a very strong focus on social infrastructure and humanitarian aid. Based on the short period 
covered, we can discern no clear time trends.  
Second, we look at the 50 % that goes to IDA, EU institutions and the two largest regional 
development banks. These figures are available for 2013 only. 
Table 4b: Percentage Distribution of Sweden multilateral aid disbursements (to IDA, EU institutions and 
regional development banks) by sector 2013 
 
EU Inst AfDB and AsDB IDA 
Weighted 
average 
Social Infrastructure 30.3 37.8 48.2 39.0 
Economic Infrastructure  31.8 43.5 26.6 32.1 
Production Sectors 8.8 9.1 14.2 11.0 
Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting 11.9 5.3 6.7 8.5 
Commodity Aid / General Prog. Ass. 5.3 2.4 0.4 2.8 
Action Relating to Debt 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.4 
Humanitarian Aid 8.3 0.0 3.8 4.8 
Refugees in Donor Countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other 3.7 0.0 0.0 1.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Sources: RIR 2014:24 and DAC CRS 
 
The Swedish multilateral aid that goes to IDA, EU institutions and regional development banks has a 
less strong focus on social infrastructure and on humanitarian aid than the Swedish multilateral aid 
that goes to the UN and other agencies. The overall pattern of the indirect sector allocation of all 
Swedish money through the multilaterals can be calculated from Tables 4a and 4b. The allocation to 
social infrastructure is 52 %, economic infrastructure 16 %; productive sectors 6 %, multi-
sector/cross-cutting 7 %, commodity aid/general program assistance 1.5 %, humanitarian aid 11%, 
other 5 %. Action related to debt is negligible. 
The indirect sector allocation of all Swedish aid money through the multilaterals between 2011 and 
2013 can be compared to the sector allocation of multilateral donors in total (Appendix Table A3). 
We see that there are 13 pp (percentage points) more on spending on social infrastructure, 6 pp 
more on humanitarian aid, 10 pp less on economic infrastructure, 5 pp less on productive sectors, 
the proportion allocated to the rest was about the same. That is, Sweden’s support via multilaterals 
focus more on social infrastructure and humanitarian aid, and less on economic infrastructure and 
productive sectors. This is the same pattern we find when comparing Sweden’s bilateral aid to total 
DAC country bilateral aid (particularly if looking at the allocation of the bilateral aid money that is not 
used for refugees in donor country). 
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The indirect sector allocation of all Swedish aid money through the multilaterals between 2011 and 
2013 can also be compared to the sector allocation of Sweden’s bilateral aid (Table 1). A higher share 
is allocated to economic infrastructure and social infrastructure. Therefore, we may say that Sweden 
through its multilateral aid gets an even stronger focus on social infrastructure. Taking into account 
Sweden’s indirect aid via multilaterals, the proportion of aid going to economic infrastructure is 
considerably higher than when only looking at the bilateral aid.  
 
5. Changes in Country Allocation  
Next, we consider the country allocation of Swedish bilateral aid. In the data on geographic allocation 
there is a large and growing category called “developing country unspecified”. This includes items 
such as administration and costs of refugees in Sweden (a little over half), while the rest is made up 
of a wide range of minor activities11. This increases from 23% in the first period to 45% in the last 
period, but we still can discuss the allocation of the remainder (Table 5). We see that the share of 
Sub-Saharan Africa in the spatially allocated aid was as high as 60% in the first period, but since then 
it has been a little above 45%. There is also a category for Africa as a whole, which has increased over 
time. So this region remains Sweden’s main focus. We may also not that there has been a substantial 
amount of aid spending within Europe since the mid-1990s. Sweden has moved out of the Americas 
and the Far East, but remains in South and Central Asia. 
 
  
                                                          
11
 The largest amounts that cannot be allocated by country (apart from administration and refugee costs) 
include allocations to the Conflict-Affected and Fragile Economies Facility (CAFEF/MIGA), Securing Water 
for Food - A Grand Challenge for Development, Save the Children humanitarian support, GPE Global 
Partnership for Education, UNICEF thematic support to water, sanitation and hygiene, Int. Planned 
Parenthood Federation, Contribution to renewable energy projects, Support to CGIAR Fund/Food security, 
funds to WSP to increase service provision of water supply and sanitation (and thereby hygiene) in fragile 
states, Swedfund capital contribution, and Various Sida projects 
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Table 5: Allocation of Swedish bilateral aid by region (Average percentage of USD commitments) 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 
South of Sahara 46.21 33.07 30.25 30.15 25.36 
North of Sahara 0.77 0.28 0.18 0.14 0.75 
Africa (unspecified) 1.98 2.17 3.54 2.85 3.35 
Middle East 1.32 3.44 2.67 5.6 5.01 
South & Central Asia 7.61 7.24 7.31 7.23 8.14 
Far East Asia 8.35 10.93 6.52 3.39 2.53 
Asia (unspecified) 0.1 0.31 0.86 0.94 0.98 
South America 2.24 2.39 2.58 2.16 2.14 
North & Central America 6.18 8.85 5.95 2.88 1.69 
America (unspecified) 1.1 0.39 0.54 0.43 0.14 
Oceania 0.04 0 0 0.01 0.01 
Europe 1.05 4.44 6.17 5.87 4.51 
Developing countries unspec. 23.05 26.48 33.42 38.35 45.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: DAC CRS data 
Next we compare this pattern of change with that of all DAC’s bilateral and multilateral aid (Appendix 
Tables A4 and A5). We first see that both bilateral and multilateral donors have maintained a strong 
focus on sub-Saharan Africa. The other bilaterals have kept a much stronger focus on Asia generally 
and also kept more activities in Latin America. The multilaterals have shifted much more to Europe 
than the bilaterals, largely driven by the European Commission support to the integration of Eastern 
Europe. They also maintain a strong presence in Asia, both relative to Sweden and the other 
bilaterals. Generally the multilaterals are spreading their activities over a broader spectrum of 
countries, partly because they have a UN mandate to deal with all countries.  
We also look at how Sweden allocated its aid across countries by income group (Table 6) and 
compare with that of other donors (Appendix Tables A6 and A7). Again we have the problem that the 
share of unallocated aid along this dimension is increasing – in the case of Sweden it goes from 29% 
to 56%. Still, we can consider what happens to the allocated share. We then see that Swedish aid has 
been increasingly concentrated to the least developed countries. The share of the allocated aid goes 
from 48% to 58.5%, which is highly significant when we also take note of the fact that there are 
fewer and fewer countries in the Least Developed Countries category. We also see that there is a 
strong focus on the least developed countries for the other donor categories as well, but they have 
not moved out of low-middle income countries as fast as Sweden. So overall that Sweden has moved 
further than the other DAC donors and the multinationals in focusing its aid efforts on the least 
developed countries. 
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Table 6: Allocation of Swedish bilateral aid by income group (Average percentage of USD commitments) 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 
Least Developed countries  47.98 44.84 53.90 53.65 58.52 
Low-Middle Income countries 24.00 30.60 26.85 27.11 22.11 
More Advanced Developing Countries and Territories 0.64 0.44 0.55 0.21 0 
Other Low Income countries 9.71 4.98 3.93 6.19 7.01 
Upper-Middle Income Countries and Territories 17.68 19.16 14.74 12.84 12.33 
Total of allocated aid 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: DAC CRS data. 
 
6. Changes in Channels and Modalities of Aid 
We would have liked to show how the modalities and channels of aid transfers have changed over 
time, but the CRS data have so many missing values for earlier years that it is not meaningful to do 
comparisons over time. Still, we take a look at the structure in the most recent period (2010-2013) 
and compare it with the structure of bilateral and multilateral donors (Tables 7a and 7b). 
Table 7a: Swedish percentage allocation of committed bilateral aid by modality and relative to bilateral and multilateral 
DAC donors 
 Sweden 
2010-2013 Sweden/ bilaterals 
Sweden/ 
multilaterals 
General Budget Support 0.98 0.59 0.22 
Sector Budget Support 0.17 0.07 0.03 
Core support to NGO, other private 
bodies, PPPs & research institutes 9.41 3.49 941.00 
Contribution to specific purpose 
program/funds managed by international 
organizations 20.65 1.92 18.94 
Basket Funds/Pooled Funding 6.17 3.88 77.13 
Project Type Intervention 31.54 0.53 0.39 
Donor Country Personnel 2.41 1.12 60.25 
Other Technical Assistance 1.86 0.61 0.64 
Scholarship/Training in donor country 0.68 0.57 2.19 
Debt relief 1.39 0.43 3.09 
Admin. costs not included elsewhere 7.64 1.31 2.29 
Development Awareness 0.39 1.34 1.77 
Refugees in Donor Country 16.28 4.24 - 
Missing 0.42 - - 
Source: DAC, CRS data 
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Table 7b: Swedish percentage allocation of USD committed bilateral aid by channel and relative to bilateral and multilateral 
DAC donors  
  
Sweden  
2010-2013 
Sweden/ 
Bilaterals 
Sweden/ 
Multilaterals 
Public Sector 35,65 0,58 0,72 
NGOs & Civil Society 29,46 2,14 7,65 
Public-Private Partnership 0,53 0,95 8,83 
Multilateral Organisations 25,67 1,72 1,97 
Other 6,36 0,72 1,02 
Missing 2,32 11,60 0,09 
Source: DAC CRS data 
Modalities are shown in table 7a. In comparison with other donors, Sweden gives much less aid in 
the form of budget and sector support. It gives much more in the form of core support to the NGOs, 
in particular relative to the multilaterals that hardly use this modality. Sweden also contributes very 
significantly to funds managed by international organizations, basket funds, and pooled funding. 
These newer types of aid modalities are thus relatively more important in Swedish aid than for other 
donors. The project type of aid is less prevalent in the Swedish programme than in the aid of other 
donors, for which it is still the dominant form. Sweden provides a relatively large amount of money 
to donor country personnel, while less other technical assistance than the other donors.  It thus 
seems as if Sweden has moved further than other donors towards new forms of aid relationships. 
A lot of the money to project type interventions (and a smaller part of the money to other 
modalities) is channelled through NGOs and civil society or through multilateral organisations. This 
money, together with the core support to NGOs and contributions to programs managed by 
international organisations, sums up like this: 29 % of Swedish bilateral aid between 2010 and 2013 
was channelled through NGOs and civil society; 26 % of Swedish bilateral aid between 2010 and 2013 
was channelled through multilateral organisations, as shown in table 14b; 36 % was channelled 
through the public sector and only a small part, 0.5 %, is channelled through public-private 
partnerships. In comparison to the other donors Sweden channels more aid through NGOs and civil 
society, and through multilateral organisations, but less through the public sector. 
When it comes to humanitarian interventions, half goes through civil society organizations, 49% 
through multilateral institutions and some though Swedish official institutions. Support to civil 
society is given through 16 Swedish framework organizations that support 500 Swedish actors and 
1400 actors in developing countries.  
Sida has always acted as a financier, but in recent years it has also been given the task to mobilise 
and facilitate the involvement of other capital and actors. At present Sida thinks that the use of 
guarantees is the most efficient way to use aid to mobilise private capital. This is currently done 
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together with e.g. USAID and the Gates Foundation. There are also challenge funds and other 
innovative way of financing. An increasing share of projects is in innovative collaboration and 
investment forms. Here Sida provides a smaller amount to make possible larger investments by other 
players and to stimulate other players to participate.  This can be in the form of guarantees for loans. 
Together with the Gates Foundation and Norway Sida has created a guarantee for orders and 
payments for contraceptive poles. There is also risk sharing arrangements with USAID. 
A typical history of changes in the modalities of Swedish aid is maybe provided by the case of aid to 
Vietnam. McGillivray, Carpenter, and Norup (2012) were given the task to evaluate the impact on 
poverty reduction of Swedish aid to Vietnam. The programme started out with health support and 
support to the paper mill Bai Bang, followed by focus on the economic reforms called DoiMoi, and 
then shifting again towards human rights, democracy, and government accountability. The overall 
conclusion of the study was that Swedish aid helped provide conditions for sustained poverty 
reduction. The three main conclusions were that Sida managed to establish a special relationship, it 
was long-term, and it was flexible and open. Overall, the pattern of change in the case of Vietnam is 
rather typical for how Swedish involvement changed over time. It started with projects of both social 
and economic character, shifted to policy reform, and then to institutions. This trend in aid 
orientation also reflects how the thinking about development determinants among development 
economists. 
 
7. Implications for aid effectiveness 
The aim of this study is to investigate how the composition and character of Swedish aid has changed 
over time, and what effects these changes have had for the potential to realize key aspects of the 
Paris agenda, and thus for aid effectiveness. We have not been able to collect direct evidence on the 
actual impact of Swedish aid, and the data available is not that comprehensive or useful anyway.12 
Instead we discuss four key themes of good donor behaviour highlighted in the Paris Agenda, namely 
Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, and Accountability. McGillivray et al. have done a series of 
evaluations of the impact of aid along similar lines. Apart from checking for consistency with the Paris 
Declaration those studies consider whether aid is consistent with the development needs of the 
                                                          
12
 Christopolos et al. (2014) have reviewed and evaluated the quality of 84 evaluations of Sida projects. The 
report found that many evaluations lacked evidence or analysis and that “very little rigorous evidence is 
presented” (p. 10) and little evidence on impacts. It is noted that “explicit attention is seldom given to 
measuring whether or not service provision is reaching and effectively serving the poor.” (p. 39) The focus of 
evaluations is more on processes than outcomes/output. There is also lack of quantitative analysis of efficiency 
in the aid process. Still, in many instances it is admittedly very hard to measure impacts. 
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recipient, and also whether it takes the implementation capacity into account (absorption capacity). 
First we note that the amount of aid given is steered by the political processes in Sweden, and we do 
not discuss what the appropriate level is. Sweden has for a long time had the aim to give one percent 
of Gross National Income in aid, and most of the time aid flows has been around that level. What we 
discuss is whether Swedish aid policy and practice has changed in a way that is likely to have changed 
the efficiency of the aid transfer. We start by considering whether policies have become more in line 
with the four dimensions of the Paris Agenda that we deem to be central and important for 
development outcomes. Then we also consider whether donors entice the recipients to address the 
right issues or not. We are aware that there are some crucial determinants of development which 
are hard to influence, such as deep-seated social norms, traditions or institutional structures. So 
when evaluating donor practices one should also take into account whether they address things 
which they can realistically influence.  
We also consider whether the interventions or transfers take absorptive capacity into account. There 
is no point in undertaking interventions that over burden the recipient system. That can be 
counterproductive and even have negative consequences. This is actually one of the reasons behind 
the Paris Agenda, so in a way this is an extension of the discussion of the four Paris dimensions 
mentioned above. Sweden has been very concerned about the implementation of the Paris agenda, 
but there has in recent years maybe been a certain Paris fatigue.  
Ownership: We have noted that Sweden was early in its concern for ownership and respect for the 
interests of the recipient governments. This was given even stronger emphasis after the introduction 
of the Paris agenda. Still, in recent years there has been a certain degree of “Paris fatigue”. There has 
not been any trend in Swedish aid in the direction of more general forms of aid such as general 
budget support, which one might expect if there was a high ambition to strengthen ownership. The 
increased focus on measuring results of the Swedish interventions has also made it less attractive to 
give support to the whole budget, since it means that it is not possible to say exactly what the 
Swedish money achieved. So although ownership is still high on the official agenda, in practice there 
does not seem to be a very strong acceptance for ownership.  
Alignment: The challenges in alignment, next, are related to those regarding ownership. The more 
specific the goals and strategies for Swedish aid, the harder it arguably is to align interventions to 
recipient interests. The specific aims of the Swedish donor may be different from those of the 
recipient government, and this may make it hard to buy into government policies. The large share of 
Swedish aid channelled through NGOs may indicate that Swedish goals differ from official 
government goals, and that the donor tries to achieve his goals in a different fashion, i.e. via non-
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government channels. This may be more productive than to try to force it through a government 
which has different agendas. It may also be advantageous in so far as it can strengthen the civil 
society, which may be needed for democratic development. 
Harmonisation: Sweden has tried to increase coordination with other donors with mixed results. The 
increased number of aid actors and aid modalities could presumably be problematic in terms of 
harmonization. Co-coordinating this increasingly complex web of stakeholders is likely to be difficult. 
On the other hand, one could argue that it could have positive implications for policy ownership 
among recipient countries, since it should allow aid recipients some choice between donors. With 
several donors lining up, a recipient country could potentially afford to turn down those imposing too 
extensive conditionality. Still, the fact that a greater share of Sweden’s total aid is today channeled 
via multi-national organizations – either as multilateral or so called multi-bi aid – should be positive 
in terms of harmonization. This also holds for basket funds and pooled funding. Whether or not 
harmonization facilitates alignment, and ultimately ownership, obviously is a very important 
question. If it mostly helps, Sweden is overall doing comparatively well. However, the use of 
alternative channels is to some extent due to the fact that there have been cuts in the administrative 
capacity of Sida making it necessary to save on administrative costs within the organization. Of 
course, transactions costs may remain and are just moved to other organizations.  
Accountability: In the Paris agenda one referred to mutual accountability. This meant that partner 
countries should strengthen the parliamentary role and involve a broad range of development 
partners. Donors should provide comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner 
authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens. Partner 
countries and donors should undertake mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed 
commitments on aid effectiveness, including those in the Paris declaration. There has not been a 
clear focus on this in recent years.  Instead the accountability discussion in Sweden has primarily 
been an increased emphasis on reporting results to the Swedish government, Parliament and tax 
payers. There is now a home page (openaid.se) with detailed information about Swedish foreign aid. 
This is well and good, but as we have noted this ambition has to some extent been detrimental to the 
achievement of the first three goals discussed above. Sweden has tried to live up to its promises to 
its partners to deliver in accordance with plans and promises, but there have been withdrawal of aid 
when corruption has been suspected. So the Swedish emphasis on this point has been that the 
recipient must be transparent and accountable. Otherwise aid will be cut. An increased reporting 
burden on part of the recipient country may be harmful in terms of accountability. Clearly, the 
recipient government should primarily be accountable to the country electorate, and not to the 
donor community.  
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Orientation: The Swedish aid emphasis has throughout been very much on social sectors and 
humanitarian interventions, and this focus has increased after the introduction of the MDGs. Sweden 
is a donor that has put relatively little weight on investments in economic infrastructure and growth. 
The Swedish idea about poverty focus is that the poor population in developing countries should 
benefit from interventions already in the short term. The idea to seek to generate growth and then 
see this trickle down has in recent years had little traction in Swedish policy circles. Since the new 
donors and the new forms of development finance do not necessarily focus on the poorest of the 
poor, maybe Swedish aid should be reallocated to the least developed countries to an even greater 
extent than it is today. But there will still be a tradeoff between short term effects of direct 
interventions towards poverty and effect in the medium to long term via growth. 
Sweden increasingly focuses, and more so than most other donors, on Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
least developed countries (although the share going to Europe has increased since Sweden joined the 
European Union). Aid orphans are an issue in the Paris Agenda. The overall picture is that less than 
half of the aid (excluding “unallocated by income”) is allocated to LDCs. This means that most ODA is 
not allocated to the countries where it is needed most. On this account, however, Sweden scores a 
bit better than the multilateral donors and considerable better than the DAC donors in general.  
The Busan meeting (2011) more or less confirmed the goals set up by the Paris Agenda. But it also 
stated that the civil sector and the private sector are important for development. Sweden channels 
almost a third of its bilateral ODA through NGOs and civil society. This might be a way to strengthen 
(national and international) NGOs in their engagement to development. So far, only a very small 
fraction of Swedish ODA goes via public-private partnerships. 
Absorbability: Swedish aid has been concentrated on the poorest countries, which is sensible given 
its goals. Still, these are also the countries that receive most aid relative to the size of its GDP, which 
means that absorption capacity is an issue. The burden of having many projects to handle and report 
on has been a challenge for many of these countries, but again the use of NGOs and other alternative 
channels is a way of reducing the burden (while reducing the level of coordination of different 
interventions). 
Overall, it seems as if Sweden has been pursuing aid policies that are reasonably consistent with the 
Paris agenda, although there seems to have been some retreat from some aspects of this. The Centre 
for Global Development has set up a system to try to measure donor efficiency, largely checking 
whether the donor policies are in line with the Paris agenda (Hashmi, Birdsall, Kharas, 2014). 
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According to these four indicators Sweden performs somewhat but not radically better than the 
average. 13 The international organizations actually score the best in this evaluation.  
  
8. Concluding Remarks about Future Directions of Aid 
We have argued that Swedish foreign aid has throughout had a mainly altruistic motivation with a 
strong focus on poverty reduction. Over the period studied we have seen an increasing focus on 
social infrastructure helping the poor also in the short term, while there has been a gradually smaller 
focus on growth enhancing economic infrastructure and productive sectors that would help the poor 
in the longer run via increased employment or for that matter increased tax revenues that could be 
used for education, health etc. We have also seen that Sweden has been moving out of middle-
income countries focusing more on the least developed countries, which of course is in line with the 
poverty focus. We also noticed that Swedish development cooperation has been concerned with 
issues on the Paris agenda such as ownership and policy alignment, although the commitment has 
varied somewhat over time. Right now there is a lively debate in Swedish policy circles (as well as in 
civil society and business) about what the Swedish approach to the new Sustainable Development 
Goals agenda should be. We conclude with our take on this given our understanding of the ongoing 
changes in the development community and in the world. 
We have noticed that foreign aid has changed significantly in the last decade, and it is likely to 
change even more in the coming ones. It seems likely that we will see a continued decline in global 
poverty levels in the coming years. The target set in the new Sustainable Development Goals is that 
extreme poverty will be completely eradicated by 2030, but it seems likely that there will remain 
some countries with wide-spread poverty. These countries will need support over the longer term. 
Still, already now most of the poor of the world can be found in emerging economies, where aid will 
matter comparatively little. So it is conceivable that much of traditional aid will be replaced by non-
concessional loans from development banks and transfers from high–income countries in support of 
global public goods. The latter could be things like climate change mitigation or measures to ensure 
financial stability or a multilateral trade regime that requires international collaboration. Building 
international regimes with international standards and norms can possibly contribute to poverty 
reduction in a more sustainable way that regular aid, since they tend to be fairly stable once agreed 
upon. There will still be a need for emergency aid that may be classified as ODA. So it seems likely 
                                                          
13
 CGD has constructed an index of the quality of official development assistance with four components 
associated with effective aid, namely (1) maximizing efficiency, (2) fostering institutions, (3) reducing the 
burden on partner countries, and (4) transparency and learning. 
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that we are moving towards a system where aid consists of four main parts, namely (1) concessional 
aid to the least developed countries, (2) non-concessional loans to a broader spectrum of countries, 
(3) support of global public goods, and (4) emergency aid. This is probably the agenda for aid that 
donors should adjust towards. 
Aid at present has a fairly clear poverty focus, but if absolute poverty declines significantly the 
overarching aim of aid may change to the reduction of global inequality. If so, there need not be an 
aid exit. But development cooperation will be more complex and cover a wide variety of policy areas. 
It seems likely that aid will matter less and less relative to other transfers of resources to developing 
countries. Private capital flows for direct investment and remittances are already more important. 
This suggests that the role of aid needs to be changed.  It will increasingly have a facilitation role 
supporting other transfers and to build capacity to handle them or build capacity to manage 
development generally. One obvious area where aid will continue to be very important is 
emergencies be it related to health or natural catastrophes or wars. Aid will need to be part of a 
global safety net. This type of problems cannot be handled by the market. Aid may increasingly be 
about transfers of capacities, technique and technologies and possibly values such as justice.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Percentages of Swedish Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Commitments 1990-2013 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 Mean 
Bilateral ODA 72.48 74 78.05 67 69.95 71.12 
Multilateral ODA 27.52 26 21.95 33 30.05 28.88 
Source: DAC1 
Table A2: Percentage distribution of total bilateral DAC commitments by sector 1990-2013 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 
Social infrastructure & Sevices 18.39 27.81 33.72 38.46 38.9 
Economic infrastructure & Services 26.81 26.4 14.47 13.66 17.24 
Productive sectors 13.47 9.97 6.71 6.08 7.62 
Multisector/ Cross-cutting 8.16 8.52 7.56 6.91 10.66 
Other Commodity aid 7.63 3.05 2.8 1.4 1.49 
General Budget Support 10.7 5.2 4.15 3.02 1.8 
Actions Relating to Debt 11.6 8.46 14.34 13.8 3.32 
Humanitarian aid 2.39 6.17 7.64 7.94 8.85 
Refugees in donor country 0 0.57 1.8 2.22 3.88 
Other 0.84 3.84 6.8 6.52 6.24 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: DAC, CRS data. 
 
Table A3: Percentage distribution of total multilateral aid commitments by sector 1990-2013  
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 
Social infrastructure & Sevices 27,35 32,99 41,08 42,85 39,03 
Economic infrastructure & Services 18,28 20,29 19,69 18,26 25,68 
Productive sectors 24,51 14,43 11,06 9,88 10,94 
Multisector/ Cross-cutting 12,51 10,8 8,52 10,17 10,44 
Other Commodity aid 1,49 3,7 2,21 1,05 0,4 
General Budget Support 12,32 6,95 9,44 8,18 4,4 
Actions Relating to Debt 0 0,14 0,77 1,36 0,45 
Humanitarian aid 3,15 8,57 4,92 4,99 4,86 
Refugees in donor country 0 0 0,01 0 0 
Other 0,39 2,12 2,3 3,25 3,8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: DAC, CRS data. 
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Table A4: Allocation of all DAC bilateral aid by region (Average percentage of USD commitments) 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 
South of Sahara 24.01 21.21 25.09 28.31 25.77 
North of Sahara 12.92 6.82 4.35 3.36 3.49 
Africa (unspecified) 0.77 0.97 0.87 1.17 1.23 
Middle East 6.93 4.83 8.71 13.27 5.45 
South & Central Asia 13 13.56 14.18 13.53 17.45 
Far East Asia 23.13 24.76 15.58 10.32 9.95 
Asia (unspecified) 0.18 0.35 0.39 0.58 0.78 
South America 5.36 6.14 5.35 3.34 3.81 
North & Central America 6.22 5.19 4.03 3.23 4.16 
America (unspecified) 0.09 0.67 0.52 0.57 0.64 
Oceania 1.31 1.33 1.36 1.33 1.86 
Europe 2.2 4.71 5.27 3.3 2.9 
Developing countries unspec. 3.88 9.46 14.3 17.7 22.52 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: DAC CRS data 
Table A5: Allocation of multilateral aid by region (Average percentage of USD commitments) 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 
South of Sahara 45.03 36.64 40.96 44.11 36.53 
North of Sahara 1.29 3.74 2.55 2.64 4.5 
Africa (unspecified) 0.06 0.08 0.27 1.2 1.61 
Middle East 0.76 2.31 2.81 4.86 4.14 
South & Central Asia 26.7 24.71 22.45 17.91 19.55 
Far East Asia 13.58 12.17 9.31 7.45 6.09 
Asia (unspecified) 0 0.25 0.39 0.43 0.26 
South America 3.85 3.46 2.68 2.1 2.26 
North & Central America 4.34 6.72 4.77 3.66 4.04 
America (unspecified) 0.01 0.29 0.49 0.34 1.39 
Oceania 1.13 0.69 0.58 0.61 0.79 
Europe 0.44 5 7.27 6.89 11.55 
Developing countries unspec 2.81 3.94 5.47 7.81 7.29 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: DAC CRS data 
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Table A6: Allocation of all DAC bilateral aid by income group (Average percentage of USD commitments) 
Income group 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 
Least Developed countries  21.45 22.29 29.32 31.44 40.17 
Low-Middle Income countries 46.23 44.51 44.26 48.93 37.44 
More Advanced Developing Countries and Territories 5.59 2.21 0.57 0.51 0.21 
Other Low Income countries 2.82 2.20 1.97 2.65 3.78 
Upper-Middle Income Countries and Territories 23.90 28.81 23.88 16.49 17.00 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 
Source: DAC CRS data 
Table A7: Allocation of multilateral aid by income group (Average percentage of USD commitments) 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 
Least Developed countries  43.78 40.28 45.48 46.80 42.36 
Low-Middle Income countries 40.04 41.52 37.11 37.11 36.37 
More Advanced Developing Countries and Territories 9.24 0.22 0.66 0.73 0.13 
Other Low Income countries 3.62 4.15 3.43 3.34 4.72 
Upper-Middle Income Countries and Territories 12.31 13.82 13.31 12.03 16.42 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 
Source: DAC CRS data 
